tornado-nova/circuits/transaction.circom
2021-11-10 12:06:44 +03:00

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include "../node_modules/circomlib/circuits/poseidon.circom";
include "./merkleProof.circom"
include "./keypair.circom"
/*
Utxo structure:
{
amount,
pubkey,
blinding, // random number
}
commitment = hash(amount, pubKey, blinding)
nullifier = hash(commitment, merklePath, sign(privKey, commitment, merklePath))
*/
// Universal JoinSplit transaction with nIns inputs and 2 outputs
template Transaction(levels, nIns, nOuts, zeroLeaf) {
signal input root;
// extAmount = external amount used for deposits and withdrawals
// correct extAmount range is enforced on the smart contract
// publicAmount = extAmount - fee
signal input publicAmount;
signal input extDataHash;
// data for transaction inputs
signal input inputNullifier[nIns];
signal private input inAmount[nIns];
signal private input inPrivateKey[nIns];
signal private input inBlinding[nIns];
signal private input inPathIndices[nIns];
signal private input inPathElements[nIns][levels];
// data for transaction outputs
signal input outputCommitment[nOuts];
signal private input outAmount[nOuts];
signal private input outPubkey[nOuts];
signal private input outBlinding[nOuts];
component inKeypair[nIns];
component inSignature[nIns];
component inCommitmentHasher[nIns];
component inNullifierHasher[nIns];
component inTree[nIns];
component inCheckRoot[nIns];
var sumIns = 0;
// verify correctness of transaction inputs
for (var tx = 0; tx < nIns; tx++) {
inKeypair[tx] = Keypair();
inKeypair[tx].privateKey <== inPrivateKey[tx];
inCommitmentHasher[tx] = Poseidon(3);
inCommitmentHasher[tx].inputs[0] <== inAmount[tx];
inCommitmentHasher[tx].inputs[1] <== inKeypair[tx].publicKey;
inCommitmentHasher[tx].inputs[2] <== inBlinding[tx];
inSignature[tx] = Signature();
inSignature[tx].privateKey <== inPrivateKey[tx];
inSignature[tx].commitment <== inCommitmentHasher[tx].out;
inSignature[tx].merklePath <== inPathIndices[tx];
inNullifierHasher[tx] = Poseidon(3);
inNullifierHasher[tx].inputs[0] <== inCommitmentHasher[tx].out;
inNullifierHasher[tx].inputs[1] <== inPathIndices[tx];
inNullifierHasher[tx].inputs[2] <== inSignature[tx].out;
inNullifierHasher[tx].out === inputNullifier[tx];
inTree[tx] = MerkleProof(levels);
inTree[tx].leaf <== inCommitmentHasher[tx].out;
inTree[tx].pathIndices <== inPathIndices[tx];
for (var i = 0; i < levels; i++) {
inTree[tx].pathElements[i] <== inPathElements[tx][i];
}
// check merkle proof only if amount is non-zero
inCheckRoot[tx] = ForceEqualIfEnabled();
inCheckRoot[tx].in[0] <== root;
inCheckRoot[tx].in[1] <== inTree[tx].root;
inCheckRoot[tx].enabled <== inAmount[tx];
// We don't need to range check input amounts, since all inputs are valid UTXOs that
// were already checked as outputs in the previous transaction (or zero amount UTXOs that don't
// need to be checked either).
sumIns += inAmount[tx];
}
component outCommitmentHasher[nOuts];
component outAmountCheck[nOuts];
var sumOuts = 0;
// verify correctness of transaction outputs
for (var tx = 0; tx < nOuts; tx++) {
outCommitmentHasher[tx] = Poseidon(3);
outCommitmentHasher[tx].inputs[0] <== outAmount[tx];
outCommitmentHasher[tx].inputs[1] <== outPubkey[tx];
outCommitmentHasher[tx].inputs[2] <== outBlinding[tx];
outCommitmentHasher[tx].out === outputCommitment[tx];
// Check that amount fits into 248 bits to prevent overflow
outAmountCheck[tx] = Num2Bits(248);
outAmountCheck[tx].in <== outAmount[tx];
sumOuts += outAmount[tx];
}
// check that there are no same nullifiers among all inputs
component sameNullifiers[nIns * (nIns - 1) / 2];
var index = 0;
for (var i = 0; i < nIns - 1; i++) {
for (var j = i + 1; j < nIns; j++) {
sameNullifiers[index] = IsEqual();
sameNullifiers[index].in[0] <== inputNullifier[i];
sameNullifiers[index].in[1] <== inputNullifier[j];
sameNullifiers[index].out === 0;
index++;
}
}
// verify amount invariant
sumIns + publicAmount === sumOuts;
// optional safety constraint to make sure extDataHash cannot be changed
signal extDataSquare <== extDataHash * extDataHash;
}