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Merge pull request #15 from peppersec/audit-circuit
Circuit audit fixes
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commit
b000e66899
@ -1,72 +1,49 @@
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include "../node_modules/circomlib/circuits/mimcsponge.circom";
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// Computes MiMC(left + right)
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template HashLeftRight(rounds) {
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// Computes MiMC([left, right])
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template HashLeftRight() {
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signal input left;
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signal input right;
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signal output hash;
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component hasher = MiMCSponge(2, rounds, 1);
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component hasher = MiMCSponge(2, 220, 1);
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hasher.ins[0] <== left;
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hasher.ins[1] <== right;
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hasher.k <== 0;
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hash <== hasher.outs[0];
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}
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// if pathIndex == 0 returns (left = inputElement, right = pathElement)
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// if pathIndex == 1 returns (left = pathElement, right = inputElement)
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template Selector() {
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signal input inputElement;
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signal input pathElement;
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signal input pathIndex;
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// if s == 0 returns [in[0], in[1]]
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// if s == 1 returns [in[1], in[0]]
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template Mux() {
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signal input in[2];
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signal input s;
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signal output out[2];
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signal output left;
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signal output right;
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signal leftSelector1;
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signal leftSelector2;
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signal rightSelector1;
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signal rightSelector2;
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pathIndex * (1-pathIndex) === 0
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leftSelector1 <== (1 - pathIndex) * inputElement;
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leftSelector2 <== (pathIndex) * pathElement;
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rightSelector1 <== (pathIndex) * inputElement;
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rightSelector2 <== (1 - pathIndex) * pathElement;
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left <== leftSelector1 + leftSelector2;
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right <== rightSelector1 + rightSelector2;
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out[0] <== (in[1] - in[0])*s + in[0];
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out[1] <== (in[0] - in[1])*s + in[1];
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}
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// Verifies that merkle proof is correct for given merkle root and a leaf
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// pathIndex input is an array of 0/1 selectors telling whether given pathElement is on the left or right side of merkle path
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template MerkleTree(levels, rounds) {
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// pathIndices input is an array of 0/1 selectors telling whether given pathElement is on the left or right side of merkle path
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template MerkleTree(levels) {
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signal input leaf;
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signal input root;
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signal private input pathElements[levels];
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signal private input pathIndex[levels];
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signal private input pathIndices[levels];
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component selectors[levels];
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component hashers[levels];
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for (var i = 0; i < levels; i++) {
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selectors[i] = Selector();
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hashers[i] = HashLeftRight(rounds);
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selectors[i] = Mux();
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selectors[i].in[0] <== i == 0 ? leaf : hashers[i - 1].hash;
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selectors[i].in[1] <== pathElements[i];
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selectors[i].s <== pathIndices[i];
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selectors[i].pathElement <== pathElements[i];
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selectors[i].pathIndex <== pathIndex[i];
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hashers[i].left <== selectors[i].left;
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hashers[i].right <== selectors[i].right;
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}
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selectors[0].inputElement <== leaf;
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for (var i = 1; i < levels; i++) {
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selectors[i].inputElement <== hashers[i-1].hash;
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hashers[i] = HashLeftRight();
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hashers[i].left <== selectors[i].out[0];
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hashers[i].right <== selectors[i].out[1];
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}
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root === hashers[levels - 1].hash;
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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ include "merkleTree.circom";
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template CommitmentHasher() {
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signal private input nullifier;
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signal private input secret;
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signal output commitment;
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signal output nullifierHash;
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@ -27,7 +26,7 @@ template CommitmentHasher() {
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}
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// Verifies that commitment that corresponds to given secret and nullifier is included in the merkle tree of deposits
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template Withdraw(levels, rounds) {
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template Withdraw(levels) {
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signal input root;
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signal input nullifierHash;
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signal input receiver; // not taking part in any computations
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@ -37,33 +36,20 @@ template Withdraw(levels, rounds) {
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signal private input nullifier;
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signal private input secret;
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signal private input pathElements[levels];
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signal private input pathIndex[levels];
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signal private input pathIndices[levels];
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component hasher = CommitmentHasher();
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hasher.nullifier <== nullifier;
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hasher.secret <== secret;
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hasher.nullifierHash === nullifierHash;
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nullifierHash === hasher.nullifierHash;
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component tree = MerkleTree(levels, rounds);
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component tree = MerkleTree(levels);
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tree.leaf <== hasher.commitment;
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tree.root <== root;
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for (var i = 0; i < levels; i++) {
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tree.pathElements[i] <== pathElements[i];
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tree.pathIndex[i] <== pathIndex[i];
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tree.pathIndices[i] <== pathIndices[i];
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}
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// Add hidden signals to make sure that tampering with receiver or fee will invalidate the snark proof
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// Most likely it is not required, but it's better to stay on the safe side and it only takes 2 constraints
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// Squares are used to prevent optimizer from removing those constraints
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signal receiverSquare;
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signal feeSquare;
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signal relayerSquare;
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signal refundSquare;
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receiverSquare <== receiver * receiver;
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feeSquare <== fee * fee;
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relayerSquare <== relayer * relayer;
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refundSquare <== refund * refund;
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}
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component main = Withdraw(16, 220);
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component main = Withdraw(16);
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4
cli.js
4
cli.js
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ async function withdrawErc20(note, receiver, relayer) {
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nullifier: deposit.nullifier,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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}
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console.log('Generating SNARK proof')
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@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ async function withdraw(note, receiver) {
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nullifier: deposit.nullifier,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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}
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console.log('Generating SNARK proof')
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@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ contract('ERC20Mixer', accounts => {
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nullifier: deposit.nullifier,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ contract('ERC20Mixer', accounts => {
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nullifier: deposit.nullifier,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ contract('ERC20Mixer', accounts => {
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nullifier: deposit.nullifier,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ contract('ERC20Mixer', accounts => {
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nullifier: deposit.nullifier,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ contract('ETHMixer', accounts => {
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refund,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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let proofData = await websnarkUtils.genWitnessAndProve(groth16, input, circuit, proving_key)
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@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ contract('ETHMixer', accounts => {
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nullifier: deposit.nullifier,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ contract('ETHMixer', accounts => {
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refund,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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const proofData = await websnarkUtils.genWitnessAndProve(groth16, input, circuit, proving_key)
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const { proof, publicSignals } = websnarkUtils.toSolidityInput(proofData)
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@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ contract('ETHMixer', accounts => {
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refund,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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const proofData = await websnarkUtils.genWitnessAndProve(groth16, input, circuit, proving_key)
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const { proof, publicSignals } = websnarkUtils.toSolidityInput(proofData)
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@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ contract('ETHMixer', accounts => {
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refund,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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const proofData = await websnarkUtils.genWitnessAndProve(groth16, input, circuit, proving_key)
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@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ contract('ETHMixer', accounts => {
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refund,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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const dummyRoot = randomHex(32)
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@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ contract('ETHMixer', accounts => {
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refund,
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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const proofData = await websnarkUtils.genWitnessAndProve(groth16, input, circuit, proving_key)
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let { proof, publicSignals } = websnarkUtils.toSolidityInput(proofData)
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@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ contract('ETHMixer', accounts => {
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refund: bigInt(1),
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secret: deposit.secret,
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pathElements: path_elements,
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pathIndex: path_index,
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pathIndices: path_index,
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})
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const proofData = await websnarkUtils.genWitnessAndProve(groth16, input, circuit, proving_key)
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