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poma 2019-07-13 02:17:35 +03:00
parent 56307341c0
commit 8f687ca146
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* Relayer is frontrunnable. When relayer submits a transaction someone can see it in tx pool and frontrun it with higher gas price to get the fee and drain relayer funds.
* Workaround: we can set high gas price so that (almost) all fee is used on gas. The relayer will not receive profit this way, but this approach is acceptable until we develop more sophisticated system that prevents frontrunning
* Bugs in contract. Even though we have an extensive experience in smart contract security audits, we can still make mistakes. An external audit is needed to reduce probablility of bugs
* Nullifier griefing - ...TODO...
* Nullifier griefing - when you submit a withdraw transaction you reveal the nullifier for your note. If someone manages to
make a deposit with the same nullifier and withdraw it while your transaction is still in tx pool, your note will be considered
spent since it has the same nullifier and it will prevent you from withdrawing your funds
* This attack doesnt't provide any profit for the attacker
* This can be solved by storing block number for merkle root history, and only allowing to withdraw using merkle roots that are older than N ~10-20 blocks.
It will slightly reduce anonymity set (by not counting users that deposited in last N blocks), but provide a safe period for mining your withdrawal transactions.